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PRACTICAL POLYPHONY: THEORIES OF
THE STATE AND FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE
Carol Weisbrod*
Polyphony: "The harmonious combination of two or
more melodies, i.e. composition considered horizontally
as distinct from Homophony, which is vertical in the
principle of its structure."'
It may be that some people call themselves "liberal," "radical"
or "Marxist" with full confidence that the terms have common definitions which will describe all of their views and all of their actions. It seems equally possible, however, that the views of many
people are less perfectly matched to common political theories, and
that their actions are in less than perfect conformity with their
theories, whatever they may be. Individual feminists-whether or
not they are publishing feminists-may similarly hold positions
derived from various identified types of feminism as well as from
sources which have no explicit reference to feminist concerns.
Feminist jurisprudence, as a movement within the American le* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. J.D., 1961, Columbia University. Many
people have provided help of various kinds in connection with this article. I would particularly like to thank Kathryn Abrams, Elizabeth Clark, Leslie Harris, Philip Hamburger,
Carolyn Jones, Richard Kay, James Lindgren, Leon Lipson, Hugh Macgill, Martha Minow,
Jeremy Paul, Pamela Sheingorn and Aviam Soifer for their assistance.
The piece takes its title from Milner Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 Mcm L REV.2280, 2288 (1989), as well as from a collection of vocal pieces called
"Practical Polyphony. Five Easy Anthems of the 16th Century." Professor Ball invokes
Mikhail Bakhtin's use of polyphony and relates it to American law:
Polyphony in narrative is the representation "of human 'languages' or
'voices' that are not reduced into, or suppressed by, a single authoritative
voice: a representation of the inescapably dialogical quality of human life at its
best." This affective representational capacity accounts for the fundamental
sympathetic relation between the aesthetics of narrative and the dynamics of
the American legal order.
Ball, supra, at 2290 (quoting Booth, Introduction, in M. BAKIITIN. PROBLEMS OF DosrosvSKY'S Pogmcs at xxii (C. Emerson trans. 1984)).
1 4 GRovE's DICrIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANs 220 (3d ed. 1927).
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gal academic environment, has in it ideas derived both from feminism and from American legal academic conversation generally.2
This paper first notes the difficulties which surface when a conventional theory of the state and law associated with liberalism is
combined with two particular themes in feminist jurisprudence-the theme of subordination and the theme of groups. Initially, difficulties arise because the description of women suggested
by dominance or oppression theories is not the description of
freely choosing individuals that participation in the liberal state
generally requires.3 Further difficulties surface because the emphases in some feminist jurisprudence on the importance of group life
and authority and on the importance of individual narrative and
experience generally-though often in fact narrative of the experience of group membership-have no similar priority in conventional theories about law and the state.
The paper then suggests that. feminist jurisprudence has certain
affinities with psychological and pluralist theories of law and the
state. These theories are useful for feminist jurisprudence not because of what they say about women but because of what they say
about law and society. It is not that one cannot think about feminist issues without these theories; it is simply that it is easier to
think about at least some problems using them, for psychological
and pluralist theories, more directly than others, seem to spell out
jurisprudential consequences of the idea that the personal is
political.
I.

THE CENTRALITY OF STATE AND LAW

M. Rameau contends that comparatively simple trebles
naturally suggest their basses, and that a person with a
true but untrained ear will naturally sing this bass. That
is a musician's prejudice, contradicted by all experience.
A person who has never heard either bass or harmony
will not only fail to find them on his own, he will even
2 For this reason, in part, an attack on the marginality of feminist jurisprudence is misplaced. For a general discussion of the non-marginality of feminist jurisprudence, see Ml.

now, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. CH!. LEGAL F. 115.

Earlier descriptions of women led to the conclusion that women were not appropriate
participants in the public world. See C. PATEMAN, THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION1 A
CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL THEORY

(1979).
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dislike them if he should hear them, and he will very
much prefer simple unison.
While some feminist jurisprudence looks to a new theory of the
state,5 much of the writing done under the banner of feminist jurisprudence uses what is a recognizably liberal theory of the state,
with conventional monist Austinian assumptions. Here, as a basic
reference point, is Alison Jaggar's version of the liberal theory of
the state, with an emphasis on legitimacy derived from consent,
offered in the context of a discussion of liberal feminism:
Within liberal political theory, the state is the only
permanent, legitimate and socially inclusive form of
human association. Of course, liberals recognize that people form other sorts of associations: families, businesses,
churches, clubs, etc., but they see these as differing from
the state in ways that are politically significant.'
"[L]iberals," Jaggar continues, "view the state as the only association that is non-exclusive, that is founded on the consent of its
members and that is concerned with protecting the basic rights of
all."' 7 The state is thus seen as the "only association that is justified in using physical coercion, although even that coercion must
be used in accordance with carefully specified procedures and for
certain very limited purposes."" That state is sovereign and, deROUSSEAU. ESSAY ON THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGES 281 (V. Gourevitch trans. 1986). Rousseau's discussion focuses on harmonic relations. For a comment on gender and harmony, see
M. GAGE, WOMAN, CHURCH AND STATE (2d ed. 1893).
When part singing was first introduced into the United States, great objection was made to women taking the soprano or leading part, which by virtue of
his superiority it was declared belonged to man. Therefore woman was relegated to the bass or tenor but nature proved too powerful, and man was eventually compelled to take bass or tenor as his part, while woman carried the
soprano ....

Id. at 58 n.18 (citation omitted).
5MacKinnon suggests that we must find a new theory since "feminism has no theory of
the state." C. MAcKINNON, TowARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 159-60 (1989). Professor MacKinnon further notes that feminist practice has "oscillated" between liberal and left
theories of the state. Id. The left theory of the state, identified as Marxist, calls for abandonment of the state as an arena. "Marxism applied to women is always on the edge of
counseling abdication of the state as an arena altogether-and with it those women whom
the state does not ignore, or who are in no position to ignore it." Id. at 160.
A. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 200 (1983).
Id.
s Id. In law, we may take J. Willard Hurst's summary as a statement of the conventional

7

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:985

spite federalist theory, is conceived as unified."
This approach is the one we 0 learned in law school and the one
which we teach. Unlike, for example, Masonic jurisprudence11 or
Jewish jurisprudence,1 2 feminist jurisprudence does not concern itself with the legal theory of a particular group. It is not about the
law of women. Rather, it is about the ideas of feminism applied to
legal materials, traditionally understood. 13 Thus, feminist jurisprudence often concerns itself with law and legal institutions. 14 In a
sense,- this critical or even oppositional movement exists comfortably with the mainstream professional assumptions of academic lewisdom on the questions of the state's relation to other groups: "Possession of the legitimate
monopoly of violence within a territory was the most distinctive attribute of our law." J.
HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 267 (1960). Of course,
[liaw shared rule making and the imposition of penalties with other institutions. [Thus,] [p]rivate clubs, trade associations, labor unions, and religious
congregations fixed terms of admission, made regulations for the behavior of
members, and fined violators or withdrew their privileges, or suspended or expelled them. [So, too,] [i]ndividuals governed much of their everyday relations
by social customs which they enforced by recognized signs of social disapproval
or by ostracism. But to take life, inflict physical pain, or confine the body were
ways of enforcing rules which this legal order recognized as properly held only
at the command of law.
Id. at 267-68.
Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1057 (1980). Frug notes that "the
need for a single unified sovereign has become a fundamental premise of Western political
thought." Id. at 1126. Federalism has not replaced the notion of unified sovereignty because
the American version of federalism retains sovereignty and places it in the people. In the
twentieth century, "[flor all practical purposes, the unified sovereign has become the federal
government (absent a constitutional convention), exercising power by virtue of the commerce clause, § 5 of the 14th amendment, the spending power, or, if necessary, another
source." Id. at 1127 n.301.
,o On who is we, "we" in this article has a shifting reference.
See D. LIPSON, FREEMASONRY IN FEDERALIST CONNECTICUT (1977); R. POUND. MASONIC
ADDRESSES AND WRITINGS

(1953); 2 R. POUND,

JURISPRUDENCE

301 (1959) (distinguishing le-

gal and social sanctions).
'2

See E. QUINT & N.

HECHT, JEWISH JURISPRUDENCE

(1980).

There is of course a problem of what we mean by feminist jurisprudence. How is work
called feminist jurisprudence distinguished from work called feminist, or work identified as
dealing with women and the law, or women's studies? Who decides if there is a difference
between a comment on feminist jurisprudence and an exercise in feminist jurisprudence?
Who decides, in short, when a question is addressed from the inside? For a discussion of
MacKinnon's "arrogance" on this point, see Bartlett, Book Review, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1559,
1564 (1987) (reviewing C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)).
" See, e.g., Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J.
997 (1985); Frug, Re-Reading Contracts:A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34
AM. U.L. REV. 1065 (1985); Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877 (1988).
"
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gal writing regarding the primacy of the state and the linkage of
law and the state.
Arguments focused on rights and law reform necessarily accept
to some degree the premises of conventional legal analysis. For this
reason some have questioned whether such agendas can ever result
in more than legitimation of existing patterns. 15 Yet it is also true
that feminist jurisprudence, like other movements, "can be viewed
both as a critique within legal education and scholarship and as a
direct challenge to their very structure.' 1 6 Thus, feminist jurisprudence contains ideas which are not so comfortably professional.
Feminist writers have suggested, for example, that law and the

state are fundamentally male;17 that rationality-if not in general,

at least as understood in the law school classroom-is male; 8 and
that males and females are substantially different, so that males
are aggressive while females are nurturing, males are objective
while females are subjective, and their experiences of legal education and legal practice are therefore entirely different.' These approaches reclaim the traditional dichotomies once used to exclude
women from the public sphere and use them to criticize the public
forum. Use of these dichotomies, however, aside from presenting
an awkward illustration of (formally rejected) dichotomous think"'See Littleton, In Search of a Feminist Jurisprudence,10 HARV. Wo sEN's LJ.1 (1987).
Other efforts suggest that because legal strategies are likely to be ineffective, other, nonlegal strategies ought to be pursued. See also Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the
Transformationof Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L REv. 1183, 1233 (1989) (discussing "nonlitigated means of transforming workplace norms" and suggesting that "much of the task of
reformulation probably will take place outside the context of litigation").
18 Littleton, supra note 15, at 2.
17Simmel had already seen this. G. SIMMF.L, ON WoaEN, SEXUAI.rrY AND Lov 68 (G.
Oakes trans. 1984) (noting male law is the only law we have). The vision of human interaction which animates much work in feminist jurisprudence is not, of course, unique to
women. As Resnik has noted "other traditions demand understanding of individuals in the
context of the communities of which they are a part." Resnik, supra note 14, at 1921 n.18
(citing J. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976)); J. VIiNG. LEGAL IDENrrT
(1978); Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AhL B.F. REs. J. 1).
18See, however, Luria's 1931 account of the rejection of syllogistic reasoning among presumptively male Uzbek peasants: "If a man was sixty or eighty and had seen a white bear
and had told about it, he could be believed, but I've never seen one and hence I can't say.
That's my last word. Those who saw can tell, and those who didn't can't say anything!" A.
LURLA THE MMUNG OF MIND 79 (1979), quoted in Birmingham, Teaching Contracts: Coming Home to Roost (Book Review), 69 B.U.L. REv.435, 446-47 (1989) (reviewing P. ATnvAN.
ESSAYS ON CONTRACTS (1986)).
'"Discussion of this point continues. See Teitelbaum, Lopez & Jenkins, Gender Legal
Education and Legal Careers,41 J. LEGAL EDUC. (forthcoming 1991).

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:985

ing, 20 reopens for discussion at least two quite difficult questions.
The first question concerns role-socialized women as participants
in the social contract; the other centers on the more general prob-

lem of groups and difference in the political structure.
One tension between feminist jurisprudence and liberal theory is

rooted in the fact that the dominance perspective, at least in its
most extreme form, invites a generalized attack on female capacity.
Liberal theory recognizes participation only by competent actors.
Children, the insane and other incompetents cannot participate
because they cannot, or cannot be permitted to, choose. 1 Only if
the consequences of subordination or suppression are viewed as essentially moderate-as a remediable injustice rather than a total
annihilation of the autonomous self 2 -can one go in the direction

of immediate public participation by women within liberalism, 23
and if the consequences of subordination are merely moderate, the

evil cannot be so great as is sometimes suggested. If we start with
the idea that the evil is that great, however, and if female con-

sciousness is almost entirely controlled,24 then serious issues exist
as to women and choice. Why should sexual activity initiated by
women, for example, be any more voluntary than that initiated by

men and consented to by women? 25 Why should the "I do" of the
10 See Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUc. 47, 51 (1988)
(discussing why we make the mistakes we identify in others).
21 See 4 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 124-27 (1959) (reviewing the law of persons).
22 The annihilation of self in whole or part, together with modes of response, is sometimes
discussed in the psychological context without special emphasis on social or cultural factors.
See L. SHENGOLD, SOUL MURDER: THE EFFECTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND DEPRIVATION (1989). One

question, of course, is whether there is such a thing as an autonomous self, or whether the
self is entirely social and a totality of roles.
3 See A. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 1890-1920 (2d ed.
1981); Weisbrod, Images of the Woman Juror, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 59 (1986).
24 MacKinnon concedes that female consciousness is not entirely conditioned and notes
that this point requires explanation. She does not, however, seem to believe that it makes
any difference. Olsen suggests that MacKinnon's focus on dominance rather than (limited)
freedom may be strategic. Olsen, Feminist Theory in Grand Style (Book Review), 89

COLUM. L. REV. 1147 .(reviewing C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)). MacKinnon

realizes, of course, that under her view, feminism could not have happened. She writes:
Feminism criticizes this male totality without an account of women's capacity
to do so or imagine or realize a more whole truth. Feminism affirms women's
point of view, in large part, by revealing, criticizing and explaining its impossibility. This is not a dialectical paradox. It is a methodological expression of
women's situation ....
C. MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 115.
2

"A person is not required to deal with another unless he so desires, and, ordinarily, a
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marriage ceremony count? Why, as Carole Pateman formulates it,
should a woman's "yes" be any more privileged, or any less open to
invalidation, than her "no"? 28 If everything becomes a false consciousness problem 7-- but somehow exclusively for women and not
for men-we would seem to be in deep trouble.28
Some writing presented in the specific context of consent to sexual intercourse is, in effect, about taking women's consent (or lack
of consent) seriously.. No means no.29 Other writing, however, sug-

gests, in effect, that women in this society are unable to consent

person should not be required to become an obligor unless he so desires." REsTATEmENT OF
RESTITUTION § 2 comment a (1936). The Restatement does not describe the world of necessity, which is to say it does not describe the real world. There is a flatness and formalism in
the legal treatment of consent which parallels the treatment of consent in some feminist
jurisprudence, particularly those arguments about taking "yes" and "no" seriously. In context, these are necessary and important arguments. In general, they offer a simpler view of
human interaction and communication than that to which we are (otherwise) committed.
One commentator, for example, notes that "[ilmplicit in [Susan Estrich's] position is a
model of how people should conduct their sexual relations, a model which is quite intellectualized and verbal." Harris, New Perspectives on the Law of Rape (Book Review), 66 TEx.
L REV. 905, 915 (1988) (reviewing S. ESTRIcH, REAL RAPE (1987)).
" Pateman, Women and Consent, 8 PoL THEORY 149, 162 (1980). See also Meyers, Personal Autonomy and the Paradox of Feminine Socialization,84 J. PHIL 619 (1987) (arguing
that traditional socialization of women does not justify conclusion that women altogether
lack autonomy). For a discussion of spousal consent (given in the context of socially constructed roles), see Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 (1985).
11 A serious problem, as Elshtain noted, is that we have no way to deal with the problem
of false consciousness-to determine, as she put it, what is altogether false and ascribed,
what is partly true but distorted, and what is altogether true. J. ELSHTIN. PUBLIC MAN,
PRIVATE WoNiAN 250 (1981).
For a view of conventional feminine behavior as "tact" and a question of meeting expectations rather than subordination, see E. GOFFMAN. PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EvERY DAY LIFE
18 n.2 (1959) (citing Harry Stack Sullivan, Socio-PsychiatricResearch, 10 Am J. PsvcniATRY 987-88 (1854), on the same issue with reference to the insane pretending to be sane).
Some feminist writing does acknowledge the impact of culture on men. See, e.g., Finley,
Choice and Freedom Elusive Issues in the Search for Gender Justice (Book Review), 96
YALE U. 914 (1987) (reviewing D. Kip. M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, GENDER JusTIcE (1986)).
Finley notes that "[mien, of course, are forced into masculine roles by the process of socialization and the obligations of social and economic dominance." Id. at 935 n.99. Goffman
quotes a description by Simone de Beauvoir of the culturally induced artifice of women and
indicates that it is a universal problem. "Through social discipline, then, a mask of manner
can be held in place from within. But as Simone de Beauvoir suggests, we are helped in
keeping this pose by clamps that are tightened directly on the body, some hidden, some
showing . . ." E. GoFFmAN, supra note 27, at 57.
28 Katherine O'Donovan noted that Catherine MacKinnon must face the problem of accounting for the authenticity of her own view. O'Donovan, Engendering Justice: Women's
Perspectives and the Rule of Law, 39 U. TORONTO L. 127, 139 n.61 (1989).
29 See, e.g., S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987).
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freely, having been so molded by the culture that it is impossible
for them to refuse certain options. Under this view, the problem is
nothing so limited as, for example, how women who value "X" are
to function in a "Y" professional world; the answer to that might
well be to change the professional world, and indeed some feminist
writing is addressed exactly to that issue.30 Instead, the problem is
women's inability to value or to make choices at all.31 The current
version of this view suggests that women are molded to be what
they are; earlier political theorists believed that women fit this
model naturally.32 Whatever its basis, however, the point here is
that the dominance views-in effect an explanation of women's
condition rather than a rejection of the traditional descriptions-are drawn so sharply that they seem to echo earlier debates
over, for example, whether women had souls (a subject which
Keith Thomas tells us was "half frivolously, half seriously" debated by theologians for many centuries33 ) or could be held to full
criminal accountability.3 4 The question sometimes seems to be
once again the one Dorothy Sayers saw: Are women human?"5
This problem, however, is of interest here largely because of its
30 Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women, 59 B.UL. REv. 55 (1979); Olsen, The Family
and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARe. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
" That these choices are complex and difficult is given. Embry provides one example of
the reality behind the yes and no of the franchise. As part of the anti-polygamy campaign,
the federal government insisted that the Woodruff Manifesto, renouncing polygamy, be ratified by the church membership. One plural wife said:
I was there in the Tabernacle the day of the Manifesto and I tell you it was an
awful feeling. There President Woodruff read the Manifesto that made me no
longer a wife and might make me homeless. I sat there by my mother and she
looked at me and said, "How can you stand this?" But I voted for it because it
was the only thing to do. I raised my hand and voted a thing that would make
me a unlawful wife.
J. EMBRY, MORMAN POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES: LIFE IN THE PRINCIPLE 12 (1987). See also Sun-

stein, Feminism and Legal Theory (Book Review), 101 HARv. L. REV. 826 (1988) (reviewing
C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987) and suggesting that term "adaptive prefer-

ence" is more generally useful than term "false consciousness").
31 But see J. MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMAN 23 (W. Carr ed. 1970) (London 1869) (arguing it is impossible in present state of society to obtain "complete and correct knowledge"

of natural differences between the sexes).
33 K. THOMAS, MAN AND THE NATURAL WORLD 43 (1983). See also M. GAGE, supra note 4,
at 56; Thurston, Has a Council Denied That Women Have Souls?, THE MONTH, Jan. 1911,
at 559.
3, See F. LIEBER, On Penal Law, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL SCIENCE 491 (1881) (arguing that women were entitled to full accountability).
31 D. SAYERS, ARE WOMEN HUMAN? (1971).
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connection to another issue. That is, the consent/capacity issue relates both to the general situation of all women as members of a
group and to the individual situation of each woman as a person
self-indentifled in particular ways, including some not limited by
gender socialization. The first tension between feminist jurisprudence and liberal theory relating to capacity thus leads to the second, relating to liberalism's view of the state and groups.
If we take as the question: "How did women arrive at a description of women's situation that is so incapacitating?" 36 we find the
conventional answer that radical feminism adopts essentially male
descriptions of reality as altogether descriptive. Thus Joan Cocks
writes that radical feminism "took the ugly word of phalliocentric
culture for the truth of the world. ' 37 MacKinnon's version is that:

"Consciousness raising has revealed that male power is real. It is
just not the only reality, as it claims to be. Male power is a myth
that makes itself true . "38
, Some of the dangers of this description have been noted. Jaggar wrote, for example, that overemphasis on the relative power of men "not only distorts reality but also
depreciates the power the women have succeeded in winning and
minimizes the chances of further resistance."39' The point here is
neither to respond to the description of women offered by the male

" The idea that women have no choice, or no self who can choose, offers a description
which seems sometimes to intensify (rather than teaching women to repudiate) masochism.
For a discussion of the need to repudiate subordination and masochism, see C. MAcKNNON,
FEMIrNsM UNMODIFIED at 176, 283 n.42 (1987) (citing A. DwoRatN. OUR BLOOD 111 (1976)).
J7CocKS, THE OPPOSITIONAL IMAGINATION: FEMINISM CRITIQUE AND POLITICAL THEORY
J.
136 (1989).
" C. MAcKINNON, supra note 36, at 104. It seems to be this description by MacKinnon
which rings true for so many people-including women lawyers and law students-in spite
of the progress of the recent past. As Joan Cocks suggests, radical feminism describes the
world as men have told women it really is. J. CocKs, supra note 37, at 136. I would suggest,
however, that radical feminism describes with considerable power not the total experience of
women in the world, but our worst experiences in the most oppressively sexist environments
in which we have lived or worked. The description is true without being the only thing that
is true. And what is tzue is not necessarily the truth of women's oppression, but the truth of
how women are often viewed. Women teachers are reminded of it in the details of our
materials. Recall, for example, Llewellyn's cute reference to the footbinding of the little lady
in China. Llewellyn, Our Case Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, 48 YALE LEU.1, 32
(1938). Compare the tone of Mary Daly's discussions-"a thousand year-long horror
show"--and note her analysis of male responsibility and "the use of women as token torturers": a serious attempt to deal with the issue of female collaboration. M. DALY. GIECOLoGY: THE METAETHICs OF RADICAL FEMINISM 134 (1978).
"9.-JAGGAR, supra note 6, at 115.
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perspective nor to attempt to solve the problem of legal capacity in
a world of gender socialization. The effort is, rather, to call attention to another aspect of what is taken as the male description of
reality.
Like the male description of women, the dominant description of
the state and law-state-centered, power-centered and official-lawcentered-is often incorporated in the feminist view. This suggests
a second problem with the use of conventional legal theory by feminist jurisprudence, for the perspective on groups and the state
which that part of conventional liberal theory"° imposes, tends to
cut us off from intellectual possibilities offered by other theories.
On the issues of law and the state as the center of power, however, feminist jurisprudence, to its credit, is more than simply an
expositor of conventional assumptions. Its mind, one might say,
has not been totally shaped by its professional education. Feminist
jurisprudence, in fact, sees both the reality of the state and other
realities. Thus, the recognition that the family is itself a sphere
often regulated by men and that "the assertion that family affairs
should be private has been made by men to prevent women and
children from using state power to improve the conditions of their
lives ' " is a kind of recognition of pluralist regulation, albeit one
which often continues to imply the primacy of state authority. 42
Moreover, statements in feminist writing on the significance of law
are tempered by the realization that the dominant view of law is
not the only significant view. The importance of official law is evident, for example, in Resnik's comment that "judges hold awesome
powers in this society. Their judgments change lives, transfer as4o Liberalism includes traditions which are not Austinian such as Libertarian or individualist anarchism. See RITTER, ANARCHISM, A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 180 (1980) (identifying
the American libertarian anarchists as liberals). Joan Cocks observes that "[i]n asserting
that men wield power as a monolithic bloc, radical feminism denied the only sources of
complexity in social life for which liberalism has had any special affection: the fact of a vast
plurality of authors and agents in the world." J. CocKs, supra note 37, at 133. Further,
because of its focus on sovereign nation-states (which have rules different from the rules of
other nation-states) it might be said that Liberalism has notably horizontal elements. In
some ways Liberalism makes room for group life, but one is not, I think, much encouraged
to think about these.
41 Olsen, supra note 30, at 1510.
"' A major emphasis, of course, is on the role of state law in empowering men in the
context of the family. On decentralization as a theme in 19th century feminism, see E.
CLARK. RELIGION. RIGHTS AND DIFFERENCE. THE ORIGIN OF AMERICAN FEMINISM, 1848-1860
(Institute for Legal Studies Working Papers Series 2:2, 1987).
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sets, imprison individuals, and even determine life and death."4 3
Significantly, however, Resnik also suggests that a part of the goal
of feminist jurisprudence is to pull back from the official stance, to
"try not to speak from an imperial position."4

It is very difficult not to speak from an imperial position while
using conventional definitions of law. Behind the feminist insistence that the state hear other voices and take alternative visions
of life seriously,45 lie deep-rooted assumptions about the
supremacy of the state and its legal system and about the singular
authority and importance of official life and the public sphere.'
This link between law and the state and this emphasis on the centrality of law4 7 are ideas we share with the rest of the legal profession which, of course, concentrates on questions relating to official
law. For lawyers at least, "the state is the legal system.'

8

As Jo-

"I Resnik, supra note 14, at 1885.
4 Resnik, Complex Feminist Conversations, 1989 U. CHL LEGAL F. 1, 6.
"I Note here the relevance of the idea that law is a place in which alternative visions of
the world compete. As Martha Minow refers to the judicial arena: it is a "forum for contests
over competing realities." Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword:Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L REv. 10, 93-94 (1987). The courts must make their choices self-consciously, soliciting "information about contrasting views of reality without casting off the
moorings of historical experience ....
" Id. at 94.
46 Other theorists uphold the primacy of the private sphere inasmuch as the virtues they
attribute to women are essentially private sphere virtues. As is often pointed out, however,
these virtues may themselves be culturally induced. "If women do sometimes speak in a
different voice, it may be one that is more ascribed than intrinsic." Rhode, Woman's Point
of View, 38 J. LEGAL EDUc. 44 (1988).
One question here is surely that the differences which are identified may not exist at all.
Most obviously, one can raise questions about the assumption of non-competitiveness and
non-aggression of female behavior. For example, Margaret Atwood's novel, Cat's Eye, provides a striking picture of the domination of one young girl by another. Focusing for a moment on the issue of the source of the desire to dominate, we find in that novel the suggestion that Cordelia (the original dominant) is playing out in relation to her victim-friend a
situation originally involving Cordelia and her dominant father. M. ATWooD.CAT'S EvI 268
(1989). But what is the source of the father's wish to dominate? The Prince beats the peasant who beats his wife who beats the children. But the Prince had a mother. And the
mother, a father. On the power of the mother, see D. DINNERSTIN, THE MERAJD AND THE
MINOTAUR SEXUAL ARRANGEMENTS AND HubuN MALAEs 176 (1976) ("[T]he essential fact
about paternal authority, the fact that makes both sexes accept it as a model for the ruling
of the world, is that it is under prevailing conditions a sanctuary from maternal authority.").
" The question "How important is law?" is frequently discussed by those studying the
intersection of law and society. See L. FRiEDUAN & S. MACAULAY. LAW AND Tim BEHAVoRAL

SCIENCES (2d ed. 1977); Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functionsof Family Law 22 U.C. DAvis L REv. 991 (1989).
" D'Entreves notes that if we look for the state we find officials: "For the jurist, the State
can be nothing other than the body of laws in force at a given time and place. The State
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seph Tussman observed, "Taking law as central we develop theories of the state as a legal order or as the 'rule of law.' " 9 As a
result, feminist legal scholars, like others in legal academic life,
tend to address the powerful50 and to translate the question "What
is to be Done?" into the question "What should the State, acting
through its judges, do?" As already noted, feminist jurisprudence
is not alone in this regard, even among reform ot critical movements. Kathryn Abrams has noted, for example, the odd focus on
the judiciary in legal writing on republicanism.5 It is a major effort
for law teachers to focus on other parts of government or even on
the influence of lower courts.
This emphasis on law and the state influences the reading of material to which we are in some ways sympathetic. The linkage between republicanism and communitarianism, 5" for example, has
tended to reduce our focus on the possibilities suggested by the
last paragraph of MacIntyre's After Virtue, suggesting a position
which can probably be described as anti-statist.5 s This position
itself is created by the law. State and law coincide; the State is the legal system."
D'ENTREVES, THE NOTION OF THE STATE 5 (1967) (emphasis in original).
49 J. TUSSMAN, OBLIGATION AND THE BODY POLITIC 73 (1960).
80

If it is presumptuous for me to address judges and justices, and to expect
them to hear me, that is the presumption of the substantive argument: that
people in power should at least try to hear contrasting points of view, not necessarily so that my view will prevail, but so that we can pursue what happens
in the back and forth. Moreover, I am responsible for what I do, and see, and
given that, what else should I say here but what I see?
Minow, supra note 45, at 71 n.283.
"' "The legal foray into republicanism has been sidetracked by its intellectual premises.
Straitened by the distinctive problems and perspectives of liberal legalism, it has produced
a muted hybrid, oddly focused on the role of the courts." Abrams, Law's Republicanism 97
YALE L.J. 1591, 1591 (1988) (urging recovery of the "popular strain in republican theory").
82 For discussions of civic republicanism, see Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985
Term-Foreword: Traces of Self Government, 100 HARv. L. REV. 4, 17 (1986) (discussing
treatment of republicanism in G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSIINET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1986)). As one commentator has noted, "[I]n legal and political scholarship, the
terms 'communitarianism' and 'civic republicanism' are often used interchangeably." Note,
A CommunitarianDefense of Group Libel Laws, I01HARv. L. REV. 682, 682 n.1 (1988). But
this misses a dimension of what is sometimes termed "Sandelianism" concerning the problem of pluralism and the state and the argument that we live in multiple communities, no
one of which has an obvious first claim on our loyalties. See M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE
LIMITS OF JUSTICE 146 (1982).
83 MacIntyre writes:
It is always dangerous to draw too precise parallels between one historical
period and another; and among the most misleading of such parallels are those

1990]

PRACTICAL POLYPHONY

sees the answer to the question "What is to be Done?" as "Reject
the State, form communities.""4 But as Kathleen Sullivan has
noted, the tradition of decentralized communitarianism is not the
tradition which generally animates the present discussions of Civic
Republicanism." Those interested in community often seek it politically and on a national scale. 56
The impulse to reform law and the state takes a specific form in
legal academic writing-the normative component of the typical
law review article with a discrete law reform agenda. 7 To the extent that legal scholarship focuses on judicial opinions, feminist jurisprudence seems often to assume, in common with the general
legal academy, that the question of how to get from here to there is
to be analyzed and answered in terms of law, law reform and better reasoned and more sensitive judicial opinions.5 8
which have been drawn between our own age in Europe and North America
and the epoch in which the Roman empire declined into the Dark Ages. [Still
there are certain parallels.] A crucial turning point in that earlier history occurred when men and women of good will turned aside from the task of shoring up the Roman imperium and ceased to identify the continuation of civility
and moral community with the maintenance of that imperium.... [And finally] [t]his time.... the barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they
have already been governing us for quite some time. And it is our lack of consciousness of this that constitutes part of our predicament. We are waiting not
for a Godot but for another-doubtless very different-St. Benedict.
A. MAcINrYRE, AFTR VIRTUE 245 (1981).
' The modern sources of this are various, and include Proudhon, late Jefferson and De
Toqueville. "Man made the State; but the commune comes direct from the hand of God."
HOCKING. MAN AND THE STATE 265 (1926) (quoting De Toqueville).
Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE U. 1713 (1988).
The risks here are often discussed in terms of Hegel's state understood as a "Godstate." L. HOBHOUSE, METAPHysicAL THEORY OF THE STATE (1918). For a different view of
Hegel, see S. Avn-zRi, HEGEL'S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE (1972).
11 The demand for law reform and normative conclusions in academic writing is more
specific, I suspect, than the general assertion, common in the New Historicism, that work
has/must have a political agenda.
Kathryn Abrams suggests one law reform program: "Many crucial problems remain: formal equality prevents many women from attaining fair divorce and custody settlements, the
feminization of poverty continues unabated, and outdated sexual stereotypes impede our
society's ability to prosecute rape." Abrams, supra note 15, at 1184.
MacKinnon rejects this, stating that her
book is not an idealist argument that law can solve the problems of the world
or that if legal arguments are better made, courts will see the error of their
ways. It recognizes the power of the state and the consciousness and legitimacy
conferring power of law as political realities that women ignore at their peril. It
recognizes the legal forum as a particular but not singularly powerful one.
C. MAcKINNON, supra note 5, at xiii.
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Something is lost, however, in discussing problems of power as if
the state monopoly of power were in fact truly and fully descriptive. Feminism recognizes this point first in analysis of issues relating to the role of women in the family or in the church 9 and, second, by way of a sense that law and law reform may not solve all of
the problems that feminism addresses.6 0 But this awareness points
the way to a more general consideration of the issue. If a discussion
is framed in terms of a spectrum of power relationships and of differing strengths in different contexts, then it might be immediately
clear, for example, that in addressing the power (or violence) of
judges and the law, we must also acknowledge the existence of limiting factors in the counter-violence and counter-power of other
groups.6 1 As Robert Cover said, these groups create their own law,
and their law is as entitled to the name "law" as the official law of
the state.6 2 Further, considerations of various forms of power lead
us directly to questions of the limits of official law, or the problem
of self-help (individual law enforcement), or gender dominance as
the unofficial law of particular groups-whether the family, the
church or the union. It is easier, I would suggest, to consider questions of gender and relative power, or of gender, choice and role
construction, in the context of legal theories which do not start
with assumptions of state sovereignty and individual citizenship or
with definitions of law which center on the state. Other theories of
law and the state are available which might prove more useful.
These theories, however, while congenial at some levels, leave certain difficulties which might well be addressed by feminist jurisprudence. Part II discusses two alternative theories and the difficulties they raise.

11 Again, a concern in feminist writing will be about use of state law to change the allocation of power within a group. See C. MAcKINNON, Whose Culture: A Case Note on Martinez
v. Santa Clara Pueblo, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 66 (1987); Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns:
Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1989).
60 Compare the historical issue of whether the emphasis on suffrage should be allowed to
entirely replace other points on the 19th century women's agenda.
61 On the power of the family, see Teitelbaum, Placing the Family in Context, 22 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 801 (1989).
2 Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword:Nomos and Narrative, 97 HAItv. L.
REV. 4 (1983). For a review of pluralist theory, see Weisbrod, Family, Church and State: An
Essay on Constitutionalismand Religious Authority, 26 J. FAM. L. 741 (1987) (citing material from English political pluralism and from legal anthropology, and distinguishing these
ideas from American interest group pluralism or cultural pluralism).
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OTHER THEORIES, OTHER PROBLEMS

The only texture in music that poses real listening
problems is

.

.

.

polyphonic texture. Music that is

polyphonically written makes greater demands on the attention of the listener, because it moves by reason of separate and independent melodic strands, which together
form harmonies. The difficulty arises from the fact that
our listening habits are formed by music that is harmonically conceived, and polyphonic music demands that we
listen in a more linear fashion ....

13

It was once conventional to see power in terms of a spectrum of
different kinds of force and/or authority in society. Thus Hocking,
discussing the problem of the state as force in 1926, noted that the
state was not the only group in society which used force and that,
"in strictness, the monopoly of force is something which the state
approaches rather than enjoys .... ."I'He cited as examples, again

entirely conventionally, the family, the school and the clan. Feminist jurisprudence insists on the importance of group narratives,"
but it is as if we believe in relative power only in principle. Traditional hierarchical jurisprudence-with a view of women at the low
end of that hierarchy-makes it difficult to actually see the world
66
in terms of relative power.

Feminist jurisprudence, therefore, is generally accustomed to
vertically constructed harmony, which is to say, hierarchy. For lawyers, it is a hierachy in which state and official law are primary. As
moderns, we start roughly with the position of Ernest Gellner who
notes that "[t]here
are some traditions of social
thought-anarchism, Marxism-which hold that even, or especially, in an industrial order the state is dispensable, at least under
favourable conditions or under conditions due to be realized in the

63

A.

Music 62 (1939).
supra note 54, at 56 (1926). See generally MEIAMI. PoLmcAL POWER

COPLAND, WHAT TO LISTEN FOR IN

V. HOCKING,

(1934).
11 See supra text accompanying note 73-76. But all voices may not have the same claims.

See Yudof, "Tea at the Palaz of Hoon": The Human Voice in Legal Rules, 66 Tx. L Rav.
589, 602 (1988).

"Economic argument, in asserting the existence of strategic bargaining chips in various
places, comes closer to realizing the possibilities of countervailing power.
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Gellner insists, though, that "[ihere are obvi-

ous and powerful reasons for doubting this .... It is clear that
industrial societies depend for the standard of living to which they
have become accustomed (or to which they ardently wish to become accustomed) on an unbelievably intricate general division of
labour and co-operation.""8 Gellner acknowledges that "[s]ome of
this co-operation might under favourable conditions be spontaneous and need no central sanctions." ' Nevertheless, he concludes,
"[ihe idea that all of it could perpetually work in this way, that it
could exist without any enforcement and control, puts an intolerable strain on one's credulity.

70

The state exists: it is necessary and

sovereign; the law is its voice; and that voice is single71 and
authoritative.
Feminist jurisprudence has begun looking in a different direction.72 This new perspective is manifest in the feminist interest in
law and literature as well as in the feminist focus on group context,
personal experience and individual narrative. As Resnik has written: "Feminist theories share a view that much of women's experiences of their lives has been omitted in the standard scholarly and
popular descriptions of the world.

'7 3

Further, Resnik writes,

"[K]nowledge of the world is constructed from one's viewpoint and
87 E. GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 5 (1983). While as' moderns, then, we tend to
assume the importance of the state, it has been said that as political theorists, we were for
some time disinterested in the theory of the state.
While the concept of the state was a central focus of modern political thought
from Hobbes through Weber, many theorists have observed that the advent of
behavioralism in political science led to the decline of the state as an object of
theoretical inquiry ....
[T]he concept of the state was an early casualty of
"scientific rigor."

J. ISAAC, POWER AND MARXIST THEORY, A REALIST VOICE 157 (1987) (referring also to a recent

revival of interest in the theory of the state). See also Lindblom, Another State of Mind, 76
Am. POL. SC. REv. 9 (1982) (analyzing failure of conventional political science to incorporate
radical thought).
8 E. GELLNER, supra note 67, at 5.
69 Id.

Id.
Our idiom as teachers reinforces the singleness of the vision: as in "You/they have
missed the point," as if there were no other point. Our texts stress the authority of the
vision. They are the work of people important in the political state of their own time. We
have little tradition in law of neglected geniuses and starving artists, voices outside the official voice.
7'2 The broadened view is not limited, of course, to works identified with feminist
jurisprudence.
73 Resnik, supra note 14, at 1906.
70

7,
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that what has been assumed (by some) as a universal viewpoint is,
in fact, a viewpoint of some men, who have articulated a vision of
reality and claimed it to be true for us all." 4 This means that a
"shared enterprise of feminism is to bring those viewpoints forward for exploration and consideration."7 From this position, feminism has gone on to consider the voices of groups other than
women or voices in which a female voice is a component but not
the whole-that is, the issue of multiple membership. 8 But it has
not yet, as far as I can tell, considered systematically the work of
those who have thought about problems of groups in society from
the perspective of a vision in which multiple authorities are the
starting point." It has not yet been notably interested in the ideas

of the English pluralists, the theories of law associated with psychological jurisprudence 8 or other theories focused on the operations of small legal systems within the larger state system.
What follows, then, is an introduction to the English political
pluralists and the thought of Leon Petrazycki-an introduction
based not on expertise (indeed, in the case of Petrazycki, I cannot
even claim access to the relevant material"9 ) but on interest and a
sense that these ideas have relevance to questions discussed by
feminist jurisprudence.
We can look to the writing of the English pluralists and try to
pick up where they left off in their discussion of the role of the
state. The tradition was invoked by Michael Walzer when he said
that "unless the state deliberately inhibits the normal processes of
group formation, and does so with greater success than has ever
74

Id.

75 Id.

-6 E.g., Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place; Asserting
Our Rights, 24 HARv. C-R.-C.L I. REV. 9 (1989).
That is, as a group women are seen by feminist jurisprudence as they would be seen in
conventional interest group pluralism: women constitute a group seeking access to the public process or decisions favoring women's interests. The concepts of state sovereignty, official
law as the regulator and the state as the source of rights are all assumed.
"' See, e.g., L. PSTRAZYcKI, LAW AND MORALITY (H. Babb trans. 1955); SOCIOLOGY AND JURISPRUDENCE OF LEON PETRAZYCKI (J. Gorecki ed. 1975).
7 Law and Morality, a translation of Petrazycki's work written in the first decade of the
20th century, was published in 1955. The translation is "an abridged version-approximately one fifth--of the original works and unfortunately is not fully representative of Petrazycki's life's work." Sadurska, Jurisprudenceof Leon Petrazycki, 32 A?. J.
Jums. 63, 64 n.4 (1987).
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yet been achieved, it will always be confronted by citizens who believe themselves to be, and may actually be, obligated to disobey."80 Walzer then quoted Figgis:
The theory of sovereignty.., is in reality no more than a
venerable superstition .... As a fact it is as a series of
groups that our social life presents itself, all having some
of the qualities of public law and most of them showing
clear signs of a life of their own.'
English pluralism is conventionally understood to include the
theories of such figures as early Laski, Cole and Figgis, Their work,
aimed largely at doctrines relating to the sovereignty of the state,
also built upon the observations of Maitland, who, as translator of
Gierke, had noted that there "seems to be a genus of which state

and corporation are species.''82 This focus on groups and group life

led the pluralists to a view of groups and the state in which the
state could no longer be said to be the sole location of what the
jurists had called "sovereignty." Not only was there not a single
sovereign, as Austin had maintained, but there were in fact many
sovereignties operating in a parallel way in any given society.
English pluralism was thus seen as a direct attack on the conventional theory of the state. Laski wrote:
The medieval worship of unity in fact is inherited by the
modern state; and what changes in the four centuries of
its modern history is simply the place in which the controlling factor of unity is to be found. To the Papacy it
seemed clear that in medieval times that the power to
bind and loose had given it an authority without limit or
question. The modern state inherits the papal prerogative. It must, then, govern all; and to govern all there
must be no limit to the power of those instruments by
which it acts.83
"S M. WALZER, OBLIGATIONS 15-16 (1970).
S, Id. at 16 (quoting J. FIGGIS, CHURCHES INTHE MODERN STATE 224 (1914)).
82 Maitland, Translator's introduction to 0. GIERKE, THE POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE

MIDDLE AGES at ix (1922).
83 H. LASKI, AUTHORITY INTHE MODERN STATE 23 (1919). American political federalism, as

early Laski saw it, did little to change this picture. "The multiplicity of governmental powers demanded by the federal system makes no difference; it is merely a question of adminis.
trative convenience." Id. at 25-26.

1990]

PRACTICAL POLYPHONY

1003

Although in America there was no "immediately sovereign body"'
as in England or France, the idea of the sovereignty of the people,
operating through the device of representation, came to roughly
the same point. But, said Laski, echoing Maitland, once it becomes
clear that "the state is only a species of a larger genus," 8 other
issues emerge. Churches deny the state absolute sovereignty, "by
which they mean that the canons of [the church's] life are not subject to the control of [the state's] instruments.""" Because of this,
Laski said, "there will be instances in which the state may find it
wise to forego its claim to supremacy. Acts of authority are thus
limited by the consciences that purposes different from that of the
8' 7
state can command.
An easy adjunct to English political pluralism was the rejection
of the definition of law as commands emanating from the state, in
favor of a definition seeing. Austinianism only as a form of
prejudice or convention. The idea was that each group could issue
its own law and provide authority for that law.88 Along with the
insistence on the importance and independence of group life came
a view of the social order as one based not on law-as-command but
on some principle of association. Thus, G.D.H. Cole, writing in
1920, criticized classical political theory for treating the state as
the "embodiment and representative of the social consciousness,"
,so that "over against the State and its actions and activities, this
form of theory has set indiscriminately the whole complex of individuals and other associations and institutions, and has treated all
their manifestations as individual actions." 89 Cole argued that this
was a false view, arising "mainly from the conception of human
society in terms of force and Law."9 0 This view, said Cole, "begins
at the wrong end, with the coercion which is applied to men in
Society, and not with the motives which hold men together in association." 91 Cole saw three sources of live social theory for his time:

"

Id. at 25.
Id. at 27.

s'Id.

8 Id. at 45.
For a general discussion of legal pluralism, see Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism, 24 J.
LEG. PLURALISM 1 (1986).
89

G.D.H. COLE. SocIAL

Id. at 7.
91 Id.

THEORY

6 (1920).
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the Church, industry (including Marxist and guild socialist
thought) and history (where he included Gierke and Maitland with
their stress on association). 2 A later discussion by G.DH. and
Margaret Cole offered this description of groups and the state:
"Every modern society is a network of associations.... Very often,
these particular associations are spoken of as if they existed, in
some sense 'within the State, and even as if they owed their being
to the State's willingness to grant them recognition.' ,,93 It is true,
the Coles wrote, that the State's attitude towards an association
can be immensely important to itY4 And while group consciousness

is ordinarily not a problem, however, it sometimes produces conflict between the group's members and the state; "it may at any
time affect them, calling up a loyalty which will influence their behaviour and perhaps bring them into group conflict with other
groups or associations or with the state itself.""0
English pluralism of the early part of the twentieth century thus
differed substantially from American interest group pluralism. The
English idea was that group life was real, independent of, and
often competing with, the state. English pluralism saw state behavior as bounded by the behavior of other groups, and this view went
with the idea that law emanated from several sources. American
interest group pluralism, on the other hand, saw the various interest groups as competing for the largess of the central state. This
approach did not diminish the state in theory, as English pluralism
tended to, but rather saw the state as the monitor of competition
for the allocation of limited resources.9 Although the English pluralists did not all believe the same thing, they had strong points in
common. It has been said that "[ihe chief political interest of
Cole's scheme, or of other contemporary schemes in the English
92 Id. If one looks for the sources of Guild Socialism, one finds, in addition to political
pluralism, the tradition of English utopianism and "distributivism," the program of Belloc
and Chesterton. See G. CHESTERTON, THE NAPOLEON OF NOT'rINO HILL (1904); see generally

S.T.

GLASS, THE RESPONSIBLE SOCIETY

,' G.D.H.

COLE & M. COLE,

A

(1966).

GUIDE TO MODERN POLITICS

370-71 (1934).

9' Id. at 372.
Id. at 372-73.
"
On American interest group pluralism, as contrasted with English political pluralism,

see

NICHOLLS, THREE VARIETIES OF- PLURALISM

(1974) (discussing Bentley, Truman, Dewey,

Lippmann, Latham and Dahl). Cultural pluralism is yet another idea which does not discuss
the theory of the state at all, but simply refers to the fact or desirability of various difference communities within the state.
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'pluralist' mold, lies of course in the proposed dissolution of the
state, understood here as a set of central institutions invested with
final authority and wielding coercive power. 8' 7 Pluralism was "a
movement which set out above all to devolve responsibilities, to
reinforce horizontal relationships, and to dispense with or at least
divide up vertical ones."9 8
Several critiques of English pluralist thought have been made.
Hocking wrote that pluralists stop short of the only thing that
would matter-an attack on the issue of force. Pluralism "proposes
no return to the former distribution of armed forces among the
various social powers. It does not advocate the abolition of force
against recalcitrant citizens and groups. '" Hocking thus concluded
that "so long as the locus of force remains untouched, political pluralism is hardly more than an assertion of the importance of group
authority and of its migrations and an appeal for modest deference
to these and other authorities on the part of governments." 0 It is
possible that this modest deference is all that is asked for by present advocates of group life. At the same time, a deeper appreciation of group life is sometimes suggested, and if some deeper sense
of pluralism is invoked, serious questions about the meaning of
pluralist theory must be confronted.
The questions have often been suggested. Nicholls, for example,
criticizes Figgis by suggesting that he was not sufficiently explicit
either on the "extent to which the state might interfere with
groups" 10 1 or the circumstances in which the state might interfere.
"The formal freedom of the individual to leave the group may be
nullified in practice by powerful economic and social pressures.
Also, may there not be groups whose way of life cripples the character of their members? 102e Other difficulties with pluralism were
suggested by the American Mary Parker Follett in 1918, when she
w Vernon, Foreword to G.D.H. COLE, GUILD SocIALIsM RESTATED at xxxv (1920).
98Id. Guild Socialism, in Cole's version at least, tried to be rid of the state. See G.D.HL
COLE, supra note 89; W. LiPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 296 (1922) (noting that, functionally, the
coordinator seemed to have all the power of the state). Other Guild Socialists saw the state
as an arbiter. See generally A. WRIGHT, G.D.H. COLE AND SOCIALST DENiOCRACY (1979);

Wright, Guild Socialism Revisited, 9 J. CoNTEhiP. HIST. 165-80 (1974).
W. HOCKING, supra note 54, at 88 (footnote omitted).
100Id. See also F. CoKEA RECENT POLITICAL THOUGHT 497-517 (1934) (examining pluralistic attack on state sovereignty).
1*1Nicholls, supra note 96, at 13.
102 Id.
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wrote that:
Society... does not consist merely of the union of all
these various groups. There is a more subtle process going on-the interlocking of groups. And in these interlocking groups we have not only the same people taking
up different activities, but actually representing different
interests. In some groups I may be an employer, in others
an employee.... The state cannot be composed of groups
because no group nor any number of groups can contain
the whole of me, and the ideal state demands the whole
of me ....
3
Yet another problem is suggested by the possibility that underneath the English pluralist approach is a commitment to a society
based on fundamental value consensus. 10 4 If this is true, how useful
can the English pluralism of the first half of the twentieth century
be to us, when it is exactly the existence of that consensus on important questions which is in doubt?
At the same time, it would also seem impossible to be committed
to ideas of pluralist group life without seriously examining historical pluralist thought. Cole wrote that "the demand for functional
devolution 101 meant "not a demand for the recognition of associa-

M. FOLLETT, THE NEW STATE: GROUP ORGANIZATION THE SOLUTION OF POPULAR GOVERN289-90 (1918). Cf. H. LASKI, GRAMMAR OF POLITICS 67 (1925) ("To exhaust the association to which a man belongs is not to exhaust the man himself .... ").
On Follett's sense of the importance of the state, see F. COKER, supra note 100. "Miss
Follett criticizes the pluralists' conception of the state as 'competing' for the citizen's loyalty; and she explains so fully the state's unifying functions, and its direct contact with
individuals, that she is hardly to be classed properly among the pluralists." Id. at 513. See
also H. KARIEL, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN PLURALISM 157-63 (1961) (critiquing Follett's
views on natural harmony and the creative role of conflict); Kariel, The New Order of Mary
Parker Follett, 8 W. POL. Q. 425 (1955).
For another American version of pluralist thinking, see C. BERNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF
THE EXECUTIVE (1938).
104 See A. VINCENT, THEORIES OF THE STATE 182, 216 (1987).
101 Guild Socialism stressed functional units rather than geographic units. Morgan notes
that while, in the 18th and 19th centuries, "the fiction of representation was sometimes
explained and defended as a means by which all the different economic or social interests in
a country had a voice in government," in fact, representation in England and America has
always been geographic. E. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 41 (1988).
For a recent critique of Guild Socialism's idea of representation, see R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY
AND ITS CRITICS (1989), and for a discussion of guild socialism/syndicalism and fascist corporatism, see G.D.H. & M. COLE, supra note 93, at 405. See also Soifer, Freedom of Associa103
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tions by the State, but a demand that the state itself should be
regarded only as an association."10 The state, he thought, might
be the elder brother, "but certainly in no sense father of the

rest. ' 10 7 We may want to reject the patriarchal images; the point is

worth attention.
Once we move from the state as the source of law, we can consider other ways of looking at law. Another agenda for feminist
work in law might involve a revival of interest in psychological jurisprudence or other work dealing with unofficial legal systems,
with a particular focus on psychology and individuals, and particularly the theory of Petrazycki. 0 s
Petrazycki (1867-1931) was a Russo-Pole who developed a theory
of law building on the idea that law existed finally in the minds of
individuals. If A has a right to money from B, and B is bound to
pay A, the legal phenomenon involved is "not somewhere in space
bewtween A and B ...

."

Rather, "[t]he legal phenomenon is in the

mind of the third person C," who thinks that A has a right to receive and that B has an obligation to pay.10 8 Human beings thus
experience legal phenomena, and they do so long before they acquire any legal capacity in official law. 110
This theory opens the possibility of looking at the experience of
legal obligation in a highly variegated way. It is not enough to assert that the law says there is an obligation and so there is. One
must say that official law says that there is an obligation, while A,
B and C (trained from childhood in specific ways, socialized differ-

tion: Indian Trib'es, Workers, and Communal Ghosts, 48 NIh. L. REv. 350, 364 (1989) (discussing American version of these ideas).
106 G.D.-. COLE, CONFLICTING SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS: PnOCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN So-

CmTY

140 (1915); cf. Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARv. L.

REv. 993 (1930) (raising the possibility that state is only another kind of association).
107 G DH COLE, supra note 106, at 159.

10s
See generally Rudzinski, Petrazycki's Significance for Contemporary Legal and
Moral Theory, 21 AL. J. OF JuRis. 107 (1976); Podgorecki, Unrecognized Fatherof Sociology
of Law: Leon Petrazycki, 15 L. & Soc'Y 183, 191 (1980). See also supra notes 78-79.
The psychological theory of law was followed to some degree by the Russian theorist M.
Reisner. M. RmsNER. SoVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 71 (H. Babb trans. 1951). But cf. E.
PASHUKANIS,

LAW AND MARXIsM A GENERAL THEORY 76-77 (B. Einhorn trans. 1978) (arguing

that real state, rather than its appearances in individual minds, was thing to be examined).
For Petrazycki on the state, see L. PETRAzYcKn. supra note 78, at 135.
106L PrrRAzycKi, supra note 78, at 135.

110 Id. at 12.
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ently and raised by different parents) either experience that obligation or do not experience it. The theory is descriptively pluralist
to the extent that it envisions the possibility of as many propositions of substantive law as there are individuals, but is normatively
less so, since Petrazycki saw a tendency of law (defined as imperative/attributive-involving a claim or right-and distinguished
from morality, which is defined as unilateral and imperative only)
toward uniformity.11 ' His work has been seen as committed to social engineering and the educational functions of official law. 112 For
present purposes, the important point is that for Petrazycki, law
"ceases to be identified with the state alone."11 3 Rather, Petrazycki
"viewed an individual as a member of different social groups which
shape her or his rights and duties. A family, a profession, an educational establishment, an association, a company, a territorial
1 14
unit, ... and each of them define appropriate human conduct.'
Petrazycki's theories lead directly to the study of interactive legal behavior in small groups such as the family or the couple, and
would seem to have direct relevance to questions of gender and
power. Consider this description by Petrazycki of the law of the
family:
[F]rom the point of view of the psychological theory of
law as imperative-attributive experiences,"1 5 family and
intimate domestic life (regardless of whether or not there
are between those participants any bonds officially recognized) is a broad and peculiar legal world which is awaitId. at 112. The point here is that because law involving a claim from a third party is
defined as attributive, there is a "tendency to get by force that which is due," and if some
ascribe obligations where others do not, there is conflict. Id. at 113. Because of this, law
tends "in the direction of bringing the legal opinions of the parties into unity, identity and
coincidence .

. . ."

Id. So that the opinions of individuals may coincide, there ought to be

general rules of obligation, and positive law (as distinguished from intuitive law) is "a suitable means to this end." Id. Positive law is defined by what Petrazycki called "normative
facts"-what was done in the past, what the statute says. Positive law, based on "extraneous
authorities," can be official or unofficial, as can intuitive law--"imperative-attributive experiences involving no reference to extraneous authorities." Id. at 114.
112

See

"3

Sadurska, supra note 79, at 75.

14

Id. at 76.

SOCIOLOGY AND JURISPRUDENCE OF LEON PETRAZYCKI,

supra note 78, at 115-32.

By this, Petrazycki referred to the distinction between obligations which are unilateral
("moral") involving a feeling of duty without a claim on the part of some other person, and
bilateral ("legal") obligations which involve not only the sense of an imperative, but also a
claim on the part of some other person.
"'
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ing investigation: a legal world with innumerable legal
norms, obligations, and rights independent of what is
written in the statutes, and solving thousands of questions unforeseen therein. While there are some features
of the content, and of the trend of the historical development, that are common to all systems of the law governing domestic relations, there are also many variants
and great differences of a more or less common origin
and a common significance. They may be connected with
the class structure of a population-the typical domestic
law prevailing in the well-to-do and rich strata is distinguished from the same law in the spheres of those who
are not well-to-do and of proletarians, while the typical
domestic law of the peasants is different from that of the
businessman and the aristocrat. But they are, in part, of
an individual character: each family is a unique legal
world, and each of those taking part in the domestic life
(including aunts, grandmothers, poor kinsfolk in remote
degree, or friends received into the house and into the
family, hangers-on, adopted and foster children, and the
like) has his own particular position in the legal mentality which prevails in that family-the right to enjoy one's
room and certain other objects alone and to take part in
enjoying other parts of the dwelling and objects, the right
to take part in common meals and pleasures and in family celebrations and the like, the right of a decisive or advisory voice in certain matters of domestic life (economic
and personal), the right to certain degrees of civility,
love, and gratitude and to appropriate behavior in different cases, and so forth.11 6
The technique for investigation was not simply the materials of
the official legal system. Rather, Petrazycki urged that one use introspection and particularly one's experience of literature as
sources for inquiry of one's experience of law. Literature, he
thought, "raised the intensity" of our experience of legal
phenomena.
[R]eading stories, novels, newspaper reports and the like
L. P

AzycKi, supra note 78, at 68.
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containing vivid portrayals of "shockingly" arbitrary conduct, clear and "sacred" rights trampled under foot, utterly just demands repudiated, and the like; the vivid image of one's own self under strong temptation to deny
and to dispute-or otherwise to trample upon the clear
and "sacred" right of another or as victim of the shockingly arbitrary conduct and violation of law; the services
of friends in bringing us (for purposes of the experiment)
the point of legal enthusiasm, or in "boiling" and indignation, and so forth; all such experimental means may
enable us to observe and to study the relevant psychic
117
experiences particularly characteristic of law.
In effect, the work of Petrazycki and others (including the English pluralists) leads to the study of small legal systems and their
norms which, as Michael Reisman suggests, "may be significant
factors in the shaping of personalities [in] ways that have civic impact and importance, not to speak of effects on an individual's autonomy, self-assurance, sense of self-worth and capacity to develop
affection toward others.""' Moreover, if work stresses psychology" 9 and psychological differences as well as the impact of gender
on these differences, the result might be a clearer idea of why some
official law (drawn from and influencing these differences) tends to
work and why some does not. The use of pluralist or psychological
theories may assist us in getting to the problem of legal capacity in
a social environment. 2 0 Pluralism clearly opens the way to consid'1

Id. at 14.

Reisman, Looking, Staring and Glaring: Microlegal Systems and Public Order, 12
L. & POL'Y 165 (1983). Reisman concludes his discussion by noting that he is
not suggesting the elimination of a public/private line: "I am not calling for a comprehensive
scheme of microlegal statutes." Id. at 182. His attempt is to
alert and sensitize scholars and the diverse official, as well as non-official custodians of the private sphere or civil order, to the fact that key aspects of individual lives are affected by microlegal arrangement. Individuals should become
aware of them so that, like the other norms of society, they may be appraised,
and, where necessary, changed to increase their contribution to a good life.
Id. See also W.M. REISMAN, Law from the Policy Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS
(W.M. Reisman & M. McDougal eds. 1985).
19 Feminist jurisprudence has of course already drawn on the writing on feminism and
psychoanalytic theory. E.g., Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence,95 YALE L.J
1373 (1986).
110We speak as though legal capacity is unitary, but we have an age of majority, doctrines
of the mature minor, early emancipation, drinking and driving ages, etc.
118

DEN. J. INT'L
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eration of various definitions of capacity by different groups; the
psychological theory of law, as offered by Petrazycki, was even prepared to consider the possibility of law in the mind of the madman. 2 ' These perspectives lead us away from a binary approach of
traditional legal theory which sees only capacity and incapacity,
and towards theories which can deal with the force of socialization
and culture in various contexts.
While some work in feminist jurisprudence has raised the
problems of the self' 22 and of multiple identification, it has not
considered these questions in the context of a jurisprudence focused specifically on the psychological aspects of legal experience
or on the rules of interaction (as against the violence of interaction) in small groups or intimate settings. Feminist jurisprudence
may wish to explore the possibilities of Petrazycki's psychological
theory of law. For example, the theory might cast light on specific
gender relations like those in domestic context. We might be able
to define the family as a legal world comprised of individuals who
have obligations as well as rights to respect, gratitude and love. We
might discern legal obligations consisting of the duty to suffer mistreatment quietly: "Even to suffer blows without repining, indignation, or resistance to bodily punishment is deemed a matter of
course by persons (slaves, children, and wives-at a certain stage
of culture) who ascribe to others the corresponding right (the
master of the house)."' 123 This obligation, felt by slaves, children
and wives, is not understood as an aspect of female masochism, but
as a psychological legal experience of particular human beings socialized in particular ways.
1 "No significance of any kind attaches either to recognition and protection by the state,

or to any acknowledgment of whatsoever sort by any one at all, as regards the concept of

law herein established and its extension to the corresponding psychic phenomena." L. P-TRAzycK, supra note 78, at 74. The law of the insane becomes a "special object of study as
pathological law or legal pathology" analogous to child law or criminal law. Id. at 75.
122 E.g., West, Feminism CriticalSocial Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHL LEGAL F. 59, 88
("What women experience on a daily basis is not a socially constructed sellhood, but rather
a socially constructed lack-of-self, a sense of selflessness.") (emphasis in original).
123 L. PgrmAzycKu, supra note 78, at 94. All of this can, of course, change.
Now ... the reestablishment of slavery, serfdom and the like would be unthinkable, not merely because it would be impossible to achieve the corresponding passive legal motivation on the part of those held to be subordinate,
but also because the masters would not be conscious of the rectitude of their
position and of the active ethical motivation of slave-possessing conduct.
Id. at 97.
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Susan Brownmiller's Waverly Place124 deals with a woman, herself abused, who fails to aid a battered child. The child dies. The
central questions of the novel are the psychology of the woman and
her responsibility for the crime. Shall we view her as a victim? As
someone who failed in maternal responsibilities? As someone who
violated the criminal law of the state? How shall we view her dependency on her abusive lover? Why, as is said as to many battered wives, did she not leave? Feminism has tended to discuss
this issue in terms of disability, low self-esteem and lack of alternatives. Brownmiller's protagonist, though, is a professional, not
the poor, untrained and desperate woman we ordinarily classify as
a victim. How then are we to see her?
To begin with, a psychological theory of law enables us to reach
an individual psychological dimension of behavior without having
to say that we are in the realm of psychology or (the generic term
for empathetic non-law) social work. One character in the
Brownmiller work describes Judith as a sado-masochist; another
only sees a victim of a one-way street of violence against women. 12
We can also say that she had a particular legal consciousness. We
can analyze victim behavior not merely negatively-in terms of
disability and powerlessness-but also in terms of a victim's sense
of obligation: 12 her obligation to obey and to be uncomplaining.
We can then focus on the possibly conflicting legal obligations to
men and children. Similarly, one can analyze the abuser in terms
of family history, background, psychology and the various legal experiences, entitlements and claims in his individual psyche, even to
the point of talking about legal pathology. One can also follow Petrazycki and think about the impact of positive official law on an
individual's experience-whether for purposes of the analysis of
that individual's case or for purposes of a general reform of the
social situation with a view towards reducing the incidence of parS. BROWNMILLER, WAVERLY PLACE (1989).
122 Id. at 146. On the history of domestic abuse,

124

see L. GORDON,

LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE (1988).
12 Another context in which this approach might make sense

HEROES OF

TiiEIR OWN

would be date rape. Do
(some) women believe tlat if a man has spent a certain amount of time/money on a date, he
is entitled to sexual relations even without her consent? Does the man in this situation
believe this? In short, what are the rules, as understood by each side? If they are the same,
how do we understand the rape? (This illustration comes from an interesting discussion of
such issues in a constitutional law class conducted by Milner Ball, Professor of Law at the
University of Georgia School of Law (Feb. 7, 1990)).
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ticular behavior.
The utility of pluralist theories for feminist jurisprudence as a
movement interested in groups is even more apparent. As noted
earlier, some of those associated with feminist jurisprudence have
acknowledged the importance of memberships in communities
based on affiliations other than gender. Thus, Martha Minow has
urged that "feminist critiques" be developed in contexts "beyond
gender, such as religion, ethnicity, race, handicap, sexual preference, socioeconomic class and age. 1 2 7 She has also noted that

group identification may not only be a matter of ascription but
also may involve chosen identifications. 12 8
Feminism, though understood to be centrally about women, is
also about men to the extent that freeing women from traditional
roles will also involve changing the roles of men.12 9 What finally do
we mean by a man or a woman?1 30 The question necessarily raises

127

Minow, supra note 20, at 47.

128 Minow,

Where Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded,
Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. CR-C.L. L Rzv. 111 (1987).
While the "assignment of difference ...marks the relationship between those who have the
power to claim that theirs is the true perspective and those who have no such power(, there
is also a] contrast between diffetences which are embraced [by the group] and those which
are not." Id. at 175 n.211. Further, there is an "enduring historical and experiential weight
of membership in groups considered different by those in power, weight that could well
persist even if power relations change." Id.
This analysis, in the context of gender, may be useful in organizing private life, leading in
some instances to various forms of female separatism.
. For a discussion of the issue of "another inside" with reference to Jews, see Galanter,
Outside, Inside: Jewish Justices in the Homeless Society (Book Review), 14 L AND Soc.
INQUIRY 507 (1989) (reviewing EL BURT. Two JEWISH JUSTICE: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMSuD

LAND (1988)).
12 As in the case of (some) women, freeing men from role constraints may not be what
they want (again, the cultural conditioning/false consciousness issue). Who told the Chinese
men, see supra note 38, what to find attractive? Who tells anyone? For a recent sciencefiction treatment of gender and ideology, see S. TEPPER, TaE GATE To Wo=N,'s CouNRv
(1988).

130 See P. BROWN, BODY AND SOCIETY. MEN, WOMEN AND SExuAL RNUNCIATION IN EARLY
CHRISTIANITY 160-177 (1988).

Basic aspects of human beings, such as sexuality, sexual differences and other
seemingly indestructible attributes of the person associated with the physical
body struck Origen as no more than provisional ....
...The body was poised on the edge of a transformation so enormous as to
make all present notions of identity tied to sexual differences, and all social
roles based upon marriage, procreation and childbirth seem as fragile as dust
dancing in a sunbeam.
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problems of group definition and membership. Yet, the issue is
only beginning to be explored systematically in feminist work.
It may be that-with significant exceptions-feminist theory has
not been forced to think in detail about issues of group membership,"' because women have been relatively comfortable with the
initial sense of the group. That is, we thought that we knew who
were women and who were men. 132 Consideration of difference and
social and self-definition 3 3 in the context of the handicapped, on
the other hand, has rejected such assumptions and has stressed
problems raised by the attribution of difference against an assumed norm. Neither approach (the apparently self-evident biological or the ascription theory) is sufficient when dealing with
34
problems of religion, ethnicity or class.1
If "How does an individual become a member of something?" is
one question, the next question must be "What is the something?"
How do we conceive the unit and its purposes, and who is "we"?
We generally begin by assuming that groups are formed by consent; however, one finds that some groups do not believe that they
are formed by consent. Rather, these groups see themselves as
formed through some other process essentially involuntary, such as
birth. Finally, some groups hold that, at least for certain purposes,

Id. at 167-68.
"', For consideration of Indian tribal membership, see Resnik, supra note 59 (noting
problem that the "other" may not, in fact, be entirely that, but may be influenced by main
system).
132 A certain complication on
this issue is introduced by the question of
transsexualism.
See J. MORRIS. CONUNDRUM (1974).
Formerly we assumed that if it took a wise man to know his father, one at least could
know his mother. New birth technologies, however, have introduced problems here as well.
133 If the self is entirely social, what is the source of the self-definition?
13' In the context of religion, the first observation must be that the idea that one chooses
religion is fine if one is thinking, for example, about protestantism, or about the position
which the state should take consistent with ideas of religious liberty. Choice of religion will
not work as a descriptive statement of the ways in which religious membership is universally
defined. As for ethnicity, one would have to confront the problems arising out of conflicts
between citizenship and ethnic identification. Is it solved by hyphenation? By the view that
citizenship is the only public identification and that ethnicity is, like religion, private from
the point of view of the state? Is it altogether self definition? See generally B, BITTxEn, Tim
CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973); M. GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES (1984). As for
class, how does one begin? Is class a matter of objective or subjective inquiry? Actual income or how one feels? When is it measured? How careful a differentiation can we tolerate
in a society officially without classes?
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there is no exit option. 135
Individuals clearly have conflicting and overlapping group memberships and role identifications. Despite this, our conversation
often focuses on small communities and groups as self-contained

and autonomous. The model of the individual and the group becomes the individual, and the particular wholly encompassing
group, the person who is one primary thing. 36 The idea of state
intervention 37 on this model is analogized to the issues of humanitarian intervention in the international context-unit against
unit-with a possible free exercise defense.13 This is a significant
perspective, but perhaps we ought to explore others. Women are
135 See Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766 (1989) (holding first amendment does not
preclude tort action against religious group for emotional distress and invasion of privacy).
"The Church of Christ believes that all its members are a family, one can be born into a
family but never truly withdraw from it. A Church of Christ member can voluntarily join
the church's flock but cannot then disassociate himself from it." Id. at 769. Is there confusion of biological and legal relationships in the reference to family? The court found that
the plaintiff could withdraw from membership in part because she did not know that by
joining the church, she was "relinquishing her civil right voluntarily to disassociate herself
from that body." Id. at 777. On this point, the dissent argued implied consent. Id. at 795
(Hodges, J. dissenting). See also Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 109 S.
Ct. 1597 (1989) (holding Choctaw Indian children were "domiciled" on reservation even
though they themselves were never physically present on reservation). Cf. J. NowAN, R.RoTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1086 (1987) (explaining idea of perpetual allegiance). "Early in our history Justice Story for the court argued that the 'general doctrine is
that no persons can, by any act of their own, without the consent of the government, put off
their allegiance and become aliens.' "Id. at 1086. A similar doctrine supported the British
impressment of seamen. As a psychological matter, the "exit option" may also have a misleading sound of finality. See B. ZAB.LCIa, THE JOYFUL COMIUNITY 282 (1971) (explaining
that apostates refer to a "constant theme" in the lives of ex-Bruderhof members: the "inability ever to completely break away").
13 This model assumes that one group represents all of the individual's interests. David
Truman noted on this point that
[t]he view of a group as an aggregation of individuals abstracts from the observable fact that in any society, and especially a complex one, no single group
affiliation accounts for all of the attitudes of interests of any individual except
a fanatic or a compulsive neurotic. No tolerably normal person is totally absorbed in any group in which he participates ....
D. TRu&iAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 508-09
(1971).
" For a discussion of the idea of state "intervention" in the family, see Olsen, The Myth
of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MIct. J.L REF. 835 (1985). Another myth of
intervention exists, mythical because of the fact of group interpenetrations with government. See Macaulay, PrivateGovernment, in L LIPSON & S. WHEELER, LAW AND TnE SOCIAL

SCENCES 445, 449 (1989).
'" See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (recognizing free exercise defense to compulsory school attendance).
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mothers, daughters, sisters, wives, atheists, Christians, Jews, lawyers, teachers, scholars, crits, realists and formalists. We identify
with many groups, without being defined completely either by any
one group or, indeed, by all the groups of which we are members.
To make this observation is to go no further than some of those
1 39
who wrote early in the century.
Building on that work is the unfinished agenda of pluralism; it
might be an appropriate one for feminist jurisprudence. Feminist
scholarship which has thus far gone furthest on this question "
tends to be concerned about problems raised by the omission of
other groups from legal thinking and the dangers which arise, for
example, when the experiences of white women are universalized.
Feminists, however, have only begun to think again about the
problems raised by considering generally what a group is or how it
is constituted, or how groups relate to each other, or how individuals choose between competing group loyalties. 14 1 Judith Resnik has
noted that "[c]ommunitarianism is a popular word in legal
academe today, but the word is used without much attention paid
to the fact of a multitude of extant communities, with competing
modes of being.' 1 42 It is also true that there is not much sense of
the complexity of the social situation as to communities, for while
some people identify with one community, probably many more
see themselves as members 143 of several or even many, all of which
make normative claims.
CONCLUSION

This Article has 'argued, in part, that feminist jurisprudence has

"'

The earlier generation of pluralists wrote, however, without the full benefit of American legal realism. If we assume that we represent the state in addressing the issue of membership, we might want to take the approach of the U.C.C. § 2-104 in defining merchants;
that is, we do not ask who is a merchant in general, but we only ask with reference to some
particular transaction or context.
140 E.g., E. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN (1988).

'41
See Follett, Community is a Process, 27 PHIL. REV. 576 (1919).

J.RESNIK, supra note 14, at 1926. Even within the limits of an inquiry based on gender, one feels that feminist jurisprudence, in general, has not even reliably reached the level
of sophistication of George Simmel on this question when he noted the limit on female
solidarity which might be created by the motherhood of sons. G. SIMMELL, THE WED Or
141

GROUP AFFLIATIONS 133-34 (R.Bendix trans. 1955). There may be many linkages stronger
than gender. See W. THACKERY, BARRY LYNDON (1844).
143 See B. BITTKER, supra note 134, at 91-105.
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aspects which mark it as a professional legal enterprise focusing
(inevitably?) 144 on the concerns of lawyers as well as the concerns
of women while accepting the unique authority of official law.
There are, however, certain aspects of feminist jurisprudence
which open other issues and provide us with different agendas.
Problems of pluralism, like those outlined here, are not new
problems in general or for American law. These were the problems
that Joseph Story recognized in 1816 in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee."5 Story stressed the "importance, and even necessity of
uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon
all subjects within the purview of the constitution." '"16 He concluded that "[i]f there were no revising authority to control these
jarring and discordant judgments, and harmonize them into uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United
States would be different in different states, and might, perhaps,
never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or efficacy,
in any two states.' 1 47 The lack of uniformity was the thing to be
avoided. "The public mischiefs that would attend such a state of
things would be truly deplorable; and it cannot be believed that
they could have escaped the enlightened convention which formed
the constitution ....11148
Some, though, have entertained the possibility that multiple interpretation may be equally valid under different public and private authorities, and equally authoritative within a particular system. The resulting situation is not deplorable, although it has
difficulties. These difficulties are greater than those involved in
governmental federalism, in which, however dispersed, power is finally seen to be allocated by an organized and recognized political
authority. Alternative theories of law allow us to modify this hierarchical allocation; 149 the alternative images tend to be those of
"" See Stanley Fish's discussion of anti-professionalism in S. FISH. DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERATURE AND LEGAL

STUDIES (1989).
141 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816).
16 Id. at 347.
,"7Id. at 347-48.
18 Id. at 348.
14 Psychological jurisprudence theories derived from Eugen Ehrlich (law of associations)
and pluralism, recognize a significant role for official law. But they tend to stress the point
that official law does not act on passive individual subjects. Thus Chester Bernard wrote:
"Authority lies always with him to whom it applies." C. BERNARD, supra note 103, at 183.
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harmony. 15 0
Finally, however, we might remember that "harmony" is itself

culturally defined; what is recognized now as harmony in music
was once called dissonance. 151 We must begin with an exercise
equivalent to ear training. Teaching us to hear the different lines
and different narratives is a major emphasis and contribution of
feminist jurisprudence. Perhaps it is too soon to judge the issue of
ultimate harmony. The first task is to learn to hear the different
parts.

1 52

"o That harmony tends either to rest on something finally incomprehensible or millonnial-the harmony simply is or will come to be-or on an assumption of the ultimate singleness of human nature and human rationality. See Weisbrod, Towards a History of Essential
Federalism, 21 U. CONN. L. REV. 979 (1989) (noting images of harmony in the utopian
tradition).
What is the relationship of any of these ideas and images and the positive law of the
state? Richard Kay writes: "Perhaps individuals, groups and governments really can co-exist
with the sole security of mutual good will and self-restraint. But that is a risky proposition-one our society seems to have rejected in seeking to establish a rule of law." Kay,
Constitutional Cultures: Constitutional Law (Book Review), 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 325
(1990) (reviewing R.F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989)).
A. COPLAND, supra note 63, at 45 (discussing changing ideas of harmony).
152 "Practical" in the title of this paper means something about first steps, easy pieces,
and using other categories to understand the world in a more complicated way than we
often do at present. Another idea of practicality is about detailing ways of actually going the
whole distance from here to there. Of course, it has always been obvious that from here to
there is a problem-filled route, not least in relation to theories of the state. As Elster comments on Nozick, even the minimalist state might have to do quite a lot under the principle
of rectification of past injustice. J. ELSTER, MAKING SENSE OF MARX 475 (1985). It might also
have to do a lot in establishing the conditions-whatever they might be seen to be-of free
choices, for men or women.

